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Attorney-Client Privilege: Expanding the
Crime-Fraud Exception to Intentional Torts
STACY KOCHANOWSKI†
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine the following attorney-client privilege scenario.1
Adam Smith is David James’s attorney. David wants to kill
his wife, Victoria, in order to collect on her life insurance
policy. David calls Adam to talk about the life insurance
policy and murder. Adam answers the call and informs David
that the conversation will be recorded for Adam to recall the
conversation, if needed, at a later date. David asks about how
murder affects the payout on a life insurance policy. He then
asks how often murders go unsolved and the easiest way to
get away with murder. Adam advises him that the best way
to get away with murder is to take Victoria out on their boat
and have her fall over the edge.2 David agrees, and the next
day he does as advised. As he pushes her over the edge, he
†My sincerest gratitude to the Buffalo Law Review, especially Courtney Way and
her team, for their hard work in making my comment publishable. A special
thanks to Prof. Christine Bartholomew, who helped me take a seed of an idea and
grow it into a comment. Lastly, thank you to my friends and family for listening
to me talk about this endlessly and contributing the creative process.
1. This is a much more straightforward, over-the-top example than what
would normally happen in practice. The crime-fraud exception can be complicated
and is usually very difficult to prove.
2. It is assumed that if Victoria’s murder goes unsolved, David will be able
to collect on the policy.
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yells out to Victoria, “This is what needs to be done. My
attorney told me how to get rid of you and collect on your life
insurance policy.”
Unfortunately for David, Victoria survives and goes to
the police. Victoria tells the police about everything that
happened, including David’s statement about his attorney’s
advice. The police bring in David, who says that his lawyer
told him that murdering Victoria was the easiest way to get
to the life insurance policy. David mentions that Adam
recorded their phone call. David is charged with attempted
murder.
After reviewing David and Victoria’s statements, the
government subpoenas Adam for a deposition and the phone
call recording. Adam moves to quash the subpoenas,
claiming attorney-client privilege. The government
responds, claiming the crime-fraud exception applies. It
submits evidence of David and Victoria’s statements.3 The
government requests that the court review the phone call
recording in camera. The court agrees to review in camera
because there is a reasonable belief that the recording will
provide enough evidence to show that the crime-fraud
exception applies.4After in camera5 review, the court decides
that the crime-fraud exception applies, based on the
recording and statements. It denies the motion to quash. The
government can now compel Adam to testify about the
conversation with David.
The previous scenario is what occurs under the crimefraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. This paper
explores the possibility of including intentional torts within
the exception. Part II discusses the development and history
3. Note that David’s statement that Adam advised him may be a waiver,
regardless of the crime-fraud exception. For the purpose of the scenario, it is
assumed that it does not waive the communication.
4. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 574–75 (1989).
5. There is not a set standard that must be met in order to apply the crimefraud exception. Courts have struggled with this. PETER NICHOLAS, EVIDENCE 316
(3d ed. 2014).
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of the attorney-client privilege. Part III then explains the
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, which
leads into Part IV, the extension of the crime-fraud exception
to intentional torts, including its acceptance and rejection by
federal courts. Part V then concludes with how to implement
the crime-fraud exception as a firm part of the crime-fraud
exception to the attorney-client privilege.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest legal
privileges.6 Each state has its own controlling statute on the
attorney-client privilege.7 However, these statutes have a
general, overarching framework, defined by Wigmore using
common law.8 According to Wigmore, the attorney-client
privilege is:
(1) where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communication relating
to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at
his insistence permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself
or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived. 9

Courts use Wigmore’s definition of the attorney-client
privilege,10 as he is considered the expert on privileges.11
However, the definition is somewhat ambiguous in
practice.12 Therefore, common law patches the holes in

6. Id. at 291.
7. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4503 (CONSOL. 2016).
8. NICHOLAS, supra note 5, at 291 (citing 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292, at
554 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010);
Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 245 (1st Cir. 2002); CP Salmon Corp.
v. Pritzker, 238 F. Supp. 3d 1165, 1171 (D. Alaska 2017).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 684 (1st Cir.
1997).
12. See id. (explaining that while the attorney-client privilege is wellestablished and a straightforward way to safeguard communications, waiver
presents a collection of different rules for different problems that are “far from
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Wigmore’s definition.
A. History of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege in the United States
derives from English law.13 In the Sixteenth Century,
England passed the Statute Against Perjury, requiring
witness attendance under penalty of a fine.14 From the
requirement, questions arose regarding witnesses’ fitness to
testify, especially those who were a party to the case.15 This
created an incentive for litigants to find out what the other
party disclosed to his legal advisor, and therefore created the
attorney-client privilege.16 However, the privilege did not
become a well-settled common law doctrine, until the
Nineteenth Century,17 after developments like attributing
the privilege to the client rather than the representative
were created.18
After the American Revolution, the United States
retained the English attorney-client privilege.19 Prior to
1820, courts in twenty reported cases, including six state
courts and two federal circuits, adopted the English

settled.”).
13. Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States § 1:1, Westlaw (database
updated Dec. 2017).
14. Id. at § 1:2. But see 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (stating that
perjury existed before the Perjury Statute of 1563 and was punishable by death
at common law).
15. Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States, supra note 13, at § 1.1. The
Statute Against Perjury deemed parties to the case unfit to testify, as the nature
of the jury trial changed from thinking witnesses were untrustworthy to wanting
witnesses to introduce the facts to the jury. This reflected a desire to have juries
rule based on their neighborhood-based, personal knowledge of the facts. If the
court found an integral witness unfit to testify, it helped the opposing party’s
case, as there would be a gap in the evidence.
16. Id.
17. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE:
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 2.2 (3d ed. 2018).
18. See Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States, supra note 13, at § 1.3.
19. Id. at § 1:12.
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attorney-client privilege.20 United States courts’ main
change to the privilege was removing the English limitation
of documents or conversations “pending or in anticipation of
litigation.”21
Congress affirmed the attorney-client privilege when it
created the Federal Rules of Evidence.22 After careful review
of proposed rules from the judiciary, the House passed the
Federal Rules of Evidence on February 6, 1974.23 In total,
there are sixty-eight Federal Rules of Evidence, covering the
topics of: judicial notice, presumptions, relevance, privileges,
witnesses,
opinions,
expert
testimony,
hearsay,
authentication, identification, and evidence contents.24
The Judiciary recommended to the House Committee
nine non-constitutional privileges, encompassing thirteen
rules.25 However, the House Committee decided to scrap the
20. Id. (citing Lynde v. Judd, 3 Day 499 (Conn. 1807); Calkin v. Lee, 2 Root
363 (Conn. 1796); Mills v. Griswold, 1 Root 383 (Conn. 1792); State v. Phelps, 1
Kirby 282 (Conn. 1787); Bank of Columbia v. French, 2 F. Cas. 631 (No. 867)
(C.C.D.C. 1804); Murray v. Dowling, 17 F. Cas. 1047 (No. 9,959) (C.C.D.C. 1803);
Anonymous 8 Mass. 370 (1811); Hoffman v. Smith, 1 Cai. 157 (N.Y. 1803);
Jackson v. Burtis, 14 Johns. 391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817); Yordan v. Hess, 13 Johns.
Rep. 492 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816); Baker v. Arnold, 1 Cai. 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803);
Riggs v. Denniston, 3 Johns. Cas. 198 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1802); Heister v. Davis, 3
Yeates 4 (Pa. 1800); Morris’ Lessee v. Vanderen, 1 U.S. 64, 1 Dall. 64, 1 L. Ed. 38
(Pa. 1782); Andrews v. Solomon, 1 F. Cas. 899 (No. 378) (C.C.D. Pa. 1816); Corps
v. Robinson, 6 F. Cas. 597 (No. 3,252) (C.C.D. Pa. 1809); Holmes v. Comegys, 1
U.S. 439, 1 Dall. 439, 1 L. Ed. 213 (Pa. C.P. 1789); State v. Squires, 1 Tyl. 147
(Vt. 1891); Parker v. Carter, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 273 (1814); Clay v. Williams, 16 Va.
( 2 Munf.) 105 (1811). These cases focused on legal advisors withholding their
own or client documents.
21. Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States, supra note 13, at § 1:12.
22. FED. R. EVID., Historical Note. In 1961, the Judicial Conference of the
United States designated the Honorable Earl Warren to appoint an advisory
committee on the usefulness of uniform evidence rules. By March 1969, the
Judicial Conference Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
approved the Advisory Committee’s draft of the rules, with edits, and submitted
the draft to the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Warren Burger, on behalf of the
Supreme Court, submitted the proposed rules to Congress on February 5, 1973.
23. Id.
24. See FED. R. EVID.
25. Id. The recommended non-constitutional privileges were: “[r]equired
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nine recommendations for two rules, Federal Rules of
Evidence 501 and 502.26 Federal Rule of Evidence 501
encompasses all privileges27 and states that the common law
governs a claim of privilege, unless there is a different rule
in the United States Constitution, federal statute, or
Supreme Court rules.28 However, Rule 501 also states that
in a civil case, state law governs a claim or defense of
privilege, if the state law supplies the “rule of decision.”29
Federal Rule of Evidence 502 discusses the disclosure
and waiver for attorney-client privilege information.30 It does
not actually explain the attorney-client privilege;
explanation is left to the common law.31
Rule 501’s application varies by court and state. In state
courts, the state statutes, court rules, and common law apply
to attorney-client privilege decisions.32 In federal courts, the
reports, lawyer-client, psychotherapist-patient, husband-wife, communications
to clergymen, political vote, trade secrets, secrets of state and other official
information, and identity of informer.”
26. See FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee notes on 1974 enactment. While
the recommended privileges were not circumscribed in a rule, a few privileges are
commonly recognized through common law, like the psychotherapist-patient,
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), husband-wife, Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40 (1980), and communications to clergymen, In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 918 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Christine Bartholomew,
Exorcising the Clergy Privilege, 103 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1020–21 (2017).
27. FED. R. EVID. 501.
28. Id.
29. Id. This means that state privilege law applies in diversity cases, while
federal privilege law applies in non-diversity cases and in cases where a federal
court uses state law to fill in gaps in federal law. FED. R. EVID. 501.
30. FED. R. EVID. 502.
31. See id. Rule 502(a) lays out the waiver requirements for disclosure to a
federal office or agency; Rule 502(b) explains that an inadvertent disclosure does
not operate as a waiver if reasonable steps were made to prevent and reverse the
disclosure; Rule 502(c) discusses state court proceeding disclosures; and Rule
502(d)–(f) explains the controlling effects of court orders, party agreements, and
the rule, respectively. Because the crime-fraud exception does not involve Rule
502’s disclosure and waiver rules, this paper focuses on Rule 501’s broad grant of
discretion to states to determine their own attorney-client privilege.
32. See PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL RULES

OF

EVIDENCE, FED. RULES

OF
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type of case dictates the attorney-client privilege application.
For cases where the state law supplies the rule of decision in
a federal civil case,33 state common law attorney-client
privilege applies.34 For federal civil cases not based on
diversity, federal attorney-client privilege law applies.35 For
federal criminal cases, federal common law principles will
apply.36
In addition to the Federal Rules, states have their own
attorney-client privilege statutes. Figure One in the
Appendix lays out each state’s attorney-client privilege
statute’s privilege holder distinction, as well as its crimefraud exception.37 In Figure One, there are slightly different
attorney-client privileges between states. However,
Alabama’s privilege seems to be the most widely accepted,
with nineteen states adopting it or a similar version.38 The
EVIDENCE RULE 501 (3d ed. 2019), Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2019).
33. Where state law provides the rule of decision, diversity jurisdiction
applies. Id. Diversity jurisdiction is a claim for over $75,000 with citizens from
different states or countries. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2011). However, diversity
encompasses more than just state law; it can appear in cases “where a claim or
defense is based upon federal law.” ROTHSTEIN, supra note 32. In those cases,
federal privilege law applies. Id. In cases of mixed federal and state law issues,
courts either favor admissibility or federal law. Id.
34. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
35. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 32; see also FED. R. EVID. 501.
36. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 32.
37. The figure provides the pertinent, relevant parts of each attorney-client
privilege. Important to note, Figure One does not give common law interpretation
of the state statutes or court rules because each court may interpret and apply
the law differently. For example, the United States District Court for the Western
District of New York may interpret New York’s common law attorney-client
differently than the Eighth Judicial District of New York. The difference may
occur by looking at different common law precedents, even though each court’s
interpretation was based on the New York’s attorney-client privilege.
38. ALA. R. EVID. 502(b). Alabama’s law is used out of simplicity in reading
the chart in the appendix—it is not indicative of time or importance. Alabama’s
privileges states that the client, as the privilege holder, can prevent disclosure of
confidential communications between: (1) the client/client’s representative and
the attorney/attorney’s representative, (2) the attorney and the attorney’s
representative, (3) the client/client’s representative, the attorney/attorney’s
representative, and an attorney/attorney’s representative representing another
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privilege applies if the communications were for professional
legal services.
Two states apply particularly unique privileges: Indiana
and Maryland. In Indiana, attorneys are not required to
testify about confidential communications made to them in
their professional capacity.39 Maryland’s attorney-client
privilege is written similarly, but it is not limited to
attorneys.40 Some states,41 like Rhode Island,42 follow the
Federal Rules of Evidence’s lead on applying common law.43
The Supreme Court has heard only a handful of cases on
attorney-client privilege.44 Only two are relevant to this
party of common interest, (4) representatives of the client, and (5) attorneys
representing the same client. The only, slight difference between states adopting
attorney-client privileges similar to Alabama is the inclusion or exclusion of
“representatives” as those who are included in the privilege. Compare ALA. R.
EVID. 502 with NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 49.035–49.115 (West 1971).
Representatives are usually defined as someone with authority to obtain legal
services or act on legal advice on behalf of the client or a person who makes or
receives a confidential communication while working for the client. See, e.g., ALA.
R. EVID. 502. This inclusive application does not stop at the widely adopted
Alabama rule. It is also used in states like Colorado, who apply the attorneyclient privilege to secretaries, clerks, and paralegals. See COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-90-107(1)(b) (West 2017). Including representatives extends liability
to law firms and corporations for disclosing confidential client communication.
39. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-3-1(1) (West 1998). This implies that attorneys
may choose to testify about confidential communications.
40. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-108 (West 1973). Maryland’s
privilege states, “A person may not be compelled to testify in violation of the
attorney-client privilege.” This implies everyone involved in the representation,
like secretaries, assistants, and clerks.
41. MI RULES MRE 501; SC R. REV. Rule 501; VA. R. PROF. COND. 1-6 (2016);
W. VA. R. EVID. 501.
42. R.I. R. EVID. 501.
43. FED. R. EVID. 501. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 states the common law
rules privilege, including the attorney-client privilege.
44. See generally United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162
(2011); Mohawk Indust., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009); Swidler & Berlin
v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 410 (1998); United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554
(1989); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985);
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981); Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391 (1976); Tierney v. United States, 409 U.S. 1232 (1972). These laws
that boot determining privilege requirements to the judiciary could be
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article,45 Swidler & Berlin v. United States and Upjohn Co.
v. United States.46 In Swidler, the Court decided that the
attorney-client privilege applies after death.47 In Upjohn, the
Court decided that the attorney-client privilege applies in
the corporate setting to workers communicating to corporate
attorneys.48
III. CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION TO THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE
In its most basic form, the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege prevents clients from obtaining
advice from a lawyer to commit a crime or fraud.49 The crimefraud exception exists to protect the professional relationship
between lawyer and client because if a client tries to obtain
advice to commit a crime or fraud, the attorney’s work is
contrary to the system established to help citizens navigate

problematic. The common law can be inconsistent among courts, even within the
same system. For example, a court in the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Illinois may
apply a previous Illinois Supreme Court decision more liberally than a court in
the Tenth Judicial Circuit of Illinois. This inconsistent legal decision-making
makes the law unfair, with different decisions based on where a case happens to
be within the state. The other states with statutory guidelines provide a basis for
the common law to build upon. The law helps maintain a universal boundary on
all courts within the state.
45. These Supreme Court cases are focused on because of their binding
applicability to all courts across the nation. While federal and state cases are
interesting and informative, they only bind their jurisdiction, thus applicability
is limited.
46. Swidler, 524 U.S. 399 (1998); Upjohn, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
47. Swidler, 524 U.S. at 410.
48. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 397. The current test from Upjohn applies the
attorney-client privilege to communication (1) at the direction of a superior (2) to
a corporate attorney (3) regarding a matter within the scope of employment. The
communication must be made with the intent to assist a corporate attorney in:
evaluating whether the employee’s conduct would bind the corporation, assessing
the legal consequences of the employee’s conduct, or formulating a legal response
to the employee’s conduct.
49. PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 2:36, Westlaw
(database updated Nov. 2018).
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the legal system.50 As the Sixth Circuit stated in In re
Antitrust Grand Jury, “all reasons for the attorney-client
privilege are completely eviscerated when a client consults
an attorney not for advice on past misconduct, but for legal
assistance in carrying out a contemplated or ongoing crime
or fraud.”51
The rules surrounding the crime-fraud exception reflect
this pro-legal system policy. For example, the court examines
the client’s intent in obtaining legal services, rather than the
attorney’s intent in giving the advice.52 “The privilege is not
lost if the client innocently proposed an illegal course of
conduct to explore with his counsel what he may or may not
do. Only when a client knowingly seeks legal counsel to
further a continuing or future crime does the crime-fraud
exception apply.”53
In addition to the attorney-client privilege, Figure One
includes the various crime-fraud exceptions to the attorneyclient privilege, as adopted by states through statutes and
court rules.54 The most common crime-fraud exception is the
one adopted by Alaska.55
Ohio and Puerto Rico have the most expansive crimefraud exceptions.56 In Ohio, the crime-fraud exception
50. Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States, supra note 13, at § 8:2.
51. In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 162 (6th Cir. 1986).
52. Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States, supra note 13, at § 8:5.
53. Id. (quoting United States v. Doe, 429 F.3d 450 (3d Cir. 2005).
54. See infra app. Fig. One.
55. ALASKA R. EVID. 503. Alaska is referenced simply because it is one of the
first entries in the appendix figure. It is not indicative of time or importance.
Alaska’s crime-fraud exception states that information sought, obtained, or used
by the client to enable anyone to commit or plan a crime or fraud negates the
attorney-client privilege. The client needs to have known or should have known
that the person’s actions were a crime or fraud. Interestingly, this crime-fraud
exception is not limited to the client’s actions. It encompasses the actions of
anyone the client assists with the information, meaning that this waives the
client’s attorney-client privilege when he or she is an accomplice or coconspirator.
56. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32 Ap. IV, § 25(c)(1); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN.
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includes actions in “bad faith” as a waiver to the attorneyclient privilege.57 This is the broadest statutory
interpretation of the crime-fraud exception.58 The second
most broad is Puerto Rico, which includes seeking advice to
enable or aid anyone to commit a crime, tortious act, or
fraud.59
California has the most unique, topic-specific crimefraud exception.60 There is a clarification clause on cannabis
because recreational marijuana use is legal within the
state.61 California specifies that the crime-fraud exception
does not apply to confidential communications on medical
cannabis or adult-use cannabis so long as the lawyer advises
the client on federal law conflicts.62
§ 2317.02(A) (West 2017). While Puerto Rico is not a state in the United States,
it is a jurisdiction within the federal system. Therefore, it is included in the
analysis.
57. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2317.02(A) (West 2017). Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “bad faith” as “dishonesty of belief, purpose, or motive.” Bad Faith,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). This crime-fraud exception includes
more conduct than what is proposed in this paper.
58. E.g., compare OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2317.02(A) (West 2017), with
ALASKA R. EVID. 503.
59. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32 Ap. IV, § 25(c)(1). This crime-fraud exception
includes more conduct than what is proposed in this paper, as it includes all
tortious conduct, not just intentional torts. However, this is the closest to the
proposed crime-fraud-tort exception. Id.
60. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 956 (West 2018).
61. Theresa Waldrop, Californians line up to legally buy recreational pot,
CNN (Jan. 2, 2018, 6:23 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2018/01/01/us/californiamarijuana-sales/index.html.
62. Almost every state has legalized some type of marijuana use and more
states are considering jumping on the bandwagon this year. Linley Sanders,
Marijuana Legalization 2018: Which States Might Consider Cannabis Laws This
Year?, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 2, 2018, 8:00 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/marijuanalegalization-2018-which-states-will-consider-cannabis-laws-year-755282.
However, while states legalized marijuana, it is still illegal on the federal level.
21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (2010). With the conflicting federal and state laws on
marijuana, more states may pass similar amendments to their crime-fraud
exceptions, like California, in order to protect their citizens from attorney
disclosure of confidential communications. If they do not pass such amendments,
attorneys may be forced to testify about communications that the client thought
would remain confidential. He or she may not realize they are committing a crime
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There are many states without statutory crime-fraud
exceptions.63 Assumptively, these states follow the same
path as the Federal Rules of Evidence, leaving the crimefraud exception solely to common law. Some states, like
Connecticut, do not specify the crime-fraud exception in the
statute itself, but provide guidance in research references.64
The common law builds upon these statutory rules, like
the attorney-client privilege itself. While the rules provide a
baseline, the application of each state’s crime-fraud
exception may vary by court and government level. Common
law precedent plays an important role in shaping the crimefraud exception by building onto the state statutes. The
timing of the client’s criminal or fraudulent intention affects
crime-fraud exception application.65 Regardless of
impossibility, the crime or fraud generally needs not to have
occurred for the crime-fraud exception to apply.66 However,
in In re Sealed Case, the D.C. Circuit held that for the crimefraud exception to apply, the proponent of the exception must
establish that the client carried out the crime or fraud,
otherwise, the court reasoned, it would deter the very
purpose of the attorney-client privilege—achieving legal
because of the state law legalizing marijuana.
63. Twenty-three states do not have statutory crime-fraud exceptions,
including New York.
64. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-84 (West 1982) (Research Refs.); see also MD
CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC., § 9-108 (West 1973).
65. Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States, supra note 13, at § 8:2. For
example, if a client legitimately enters into an attorney-client relationship for
legitimate legal services, then intentionally uses the lawyer for illegal or
fraudulent purposes, courts disregard the crime-fraud exception. Instead, they
examine the action as a waiver. However, if the client comes to the lawyer for
illegal and legitimate legal services combined, the court applies the crime-fraud
exception. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 445 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2006).
Additionally, if the crime or fraud was not committed because of an intervening
factor, the crime-fraud exception still applies. Impossibility does not negate the
intention of the individual. However, the intervening factor application is
complicated if impossibility is a defense to the criminal charge. The crime-fraud
exception would not apply, as there is no case against the individual who sought
the advice.
66. Id.
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compliance through legal advice.67
At the federal level, some circuits require a prima-facie
showing of a violation of the attorney-client privilege
violation.68 The burden is on the government to show that
the communication falls outside the attorney-client
privilege.69
To overcome an established privilege using the crime-fraud
exception, the government must show that the communications (i)
were made for an unlawful purpose or to further an illegal scheme
and (ii) reflect an ongoing or future unlawful or illegal scheme or
activity. Importantly, the purported crime or fraud need not be
proved either by a preponderance or beyond a reasonable doubt.
Rather, the proof “must be such as to subject the opposing party to
the risk of non-persuasion of the evidence as to the disputed fact is
left unrebutted.”70

To meet this prima-facie burden, the government may
use inadmissible evidence, such as hearsay, so long as it has
been lawfully obtained and is not otherwise privileged.71
Parties may also use the attorney-client communications
at issue to meet the crime-fraud exception’s prima-facie
burden, which utilizes in camera review.72 In United States
v. Zolin, the IRS requested tapes and other evidence from a
county clerk in order to aid a current investigation.73 The
tapes were from a previous case, Church of Scientology of
California v. Armstong.74 When the IRS requested the tapes,
members of the Church of Scientology filed a temporary

67. Id. This precedent is still good law.
68. In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 165 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 731 F.2d, 1032, 1039 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Int’l Sys. &
Controls Corp., 693 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1982)).
69. United States v. Lentz, 419 F. Supp. 2d 820, 831 (E.D. Va. 2005).
70. Id. (citing Union Camp Corp. v. Lewis, 385 F.2d 143, 144–45 (4th Cir.
1967)).
71. Id.
72. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 565 (1989).
73. Id. at 557.
74. Id.
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restraining order preventing the tapes from being turned
over to the IRS.75 The IRS filed a petition in federal district
court in order to enforce the summons, but the court refused
to enforce it, reasoning that the tapes contained confidential
attorney-client matters and that the crime-fraud exception
did not apply.76 The IRS appealed, claiming that the district
court erred in denying the IRS’s request for in camera
review77 of the tapes to determine if the crime-fraud
exception applied.78
On appeal, the Supreme Court decided that the Federal
Rule of Evidence allows in camera review to determine
whether the crime-fraud exception would apply.79 However,
before in camera review, the party asserting the crime-fraud
exception must show there is a “‘[f]actual basis adequate to
support a good faith belief by reasonable person’ that in
camera review of the materials may reveal evidence to
establish the claim that the crime-fraud exception applies.”80
In other words, the government must present evidence, in
addition to the communications, for the court to even
consider if the crime-fraud exception applies.81
Burdens of proof vary slightly across circuits. For
example, as stated above, the D.C. Circuit requires the
75. Id. at 557–58.
76. Id. at 558–59.
77. In camera review is when the court views potential evidence privately to
determine its admissibility. See In Camera Inspection Law and Legal Definition,
USLEGAL, https://definitions.uslegal.com/i/in-camera/ (Last visited Jun. 19,
2019).
78. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 560.
79. Id. at 568 (“[w]e shall not interpret Rule 104(a) as categorically
prohibiting the party opposing the privilege to crime-fraud grounds from relying
on the results of an in camera review of the communications.”).
80. Id. at 572 (quoting Caldwell v. District Court, 644 P.2d 26, 33 (Colo.
1982)).
81. This is like requiring corroborative evidence. Therefore, while there is not
a burden of proof for the crime fraud-exception to apply, see Attorney-Client
Privilege in the United States, supra note 13, at § 8:2, there is a heavy
requirement.
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defendant to have committed the crime or fraud.82 However,
within the Second and Fourth Circuit “it is simply
immaterial whether the defendant actually succeeded in
completing the crime or fraud in question; rather, solicitation
[of the attorney] alone triggers the exception.”83 The slight
differences in the crime-fraud exception application only
exist in the second part of the rule, stated below and thus the
rule generally remains unchanged for in camera review.
Based on Zolin, the rule for determining if a court may
apply the crime-fraud exception is as follows: the party
asserting the crime-fraud exception may present evidence
based on a reasonable belief that in camera review of the
communications may provide enough evidence to apply the
crime-fraud exception. The evidence presented must be
relevant, lawfully obtained, and non-privileged.84 If that
burden is met, then the circuit-specific crime-fraud exception
rules apply to determine if there is an actual crime-fraud
exception.
An extension of the attorney-client privilege, the work
product doctrine, is often discussed in crime-fraud exception
cases. The work product doctrine originated in a 1947
Supreme Court case, Hickman v. Taylor and stands for the
proposition that an attorney’s physical work on a case, like
notes, is generally undiscoverable.85 For the crime-fraud
82. Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States, supra note 13, at § 8:2
(citing In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d 46, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
83. Lentz, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 830 (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1039 (2d Cir. 1984)).
84. See Zolin, 491 U.S. at 574–75.
85. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). In Hickman, after a tugboat
crash, the tugboat owners’ attorney interviewed witnesses. Id. at 498–99. In an
interrogatory, the opposing party requested the witness names and statements,
but the tugboat owners’ attorney refused to turn over his documentation on the
witnesses’ statements. Id. The Court ruled that the attorney could not be forced
to turn over the statements with his personal notes because of the attorney’s duty
to “work for the advancement of justice, while faithfully protecting the rightful
interest of his clients.” Id. at 510. However, the Court noted the rule that an
attorney’s work is free from discovery is not absolute. Id. at 511–12. Courts could
make an exception “[w]here relevant and non-privileged facts remain hidden in
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exception, the work product doctrine does not protect the
work completed by the lawyer, as the information was to
further a crime or fraud.86 Like the crime-fraud exception
applies to conversations, it applies to writing.
IV. EXTENSION OF THE CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION TO
INTENTIONAL TORTS
Some courts have embraced expanding the crime-fraud
exception to intentional torts. As their name implies,
intentional torts require an intentional act by the
defendant.87 Intentional torts are similar to crimes, but exist
in civil rather than criminal law. They are more serious than
negligent torts, due to increased culpability.88 “Intentional”
means that “[a]n actor . . . brings about harm either
purposefully or knowingly”;89 the intention is not in the
harm, but in doing the activity.90 This requirement affects
an attorney’s file and where production of those facts is essential to the
preparation of one’s case.” Id. at 511. The rule and exception laid the foundation
of the work product doctrine, encompassed in Rule Twenty-Six of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See G. Michael Halfenger, The Attorney Misconduct
Exception to the Work Product Doctrine, 58 U. OF CHI L. R. 1079, 1080 (1991).
86. See In re Grand Jury Matter #3, 847 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2017); Tri-State
Hosp. Supply Corp. v. United States, 238 F.R.D. 102, 104 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing In
re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d 46, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
87. Beyond showing intention, each intentional tort has different elements.
See Intentional Tort, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
intentional_tort (last visited Mar. 20, 2018). For example, to prove intentional
infliction of emotional distress in New York, the plaintiff must prove “(1) extreme
and outrageous conduct, (2) intent to cause severe emotional distress, (3) a causal
connection between the conduct and injury, and (4) severe emotional distress.”
Dorn v. Maffei, 386 F. Supp. 2d 479, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). However, to prove
slander, the plaintiff must prove (1) there was a defamatory statement, (2)
published to a third party, (3) concerning the plaintiff, (4) with the applicable
level of fault (intentional), (5) causing special harm or constituting slander per
se, (6) not protected by privilege. Albert v. Loksen, 239 F.3d 256, 265–66 (2d Cir.
2001).
88. See Intentional Tort, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/intentional_tort (last visited Mar. 20, 2018).
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GEN. PRINCIPLES § 1 DD (AM. LAW INST.
1999).
90. Intentional

Torts,

LEGAL

DICTIONARY

https://legaldictionary.net/
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the proof needed to be fulfilled to bring the claim.91 The
definition of intention is different from “negligence,” which
means “the failure to exercise the standard of care that a
reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar
situation.”92 Negligence does not include intentional,
wanton, or willful conduct.93
Some courts embrace intentional torts as part of the
crime-fraud exception, while others reject it.
A. Acceptance of and Arguments for the Crime-Fraud-Tort
Exception
While the original meaning of the crime-fraud exception
includes crimes and frauds, an increasing number of courts
now apply the crime-fraud exception to intentional torts. In
1950, the idea of the crime-fraud exception applying to torts
was first discussed, in dictum, in United States v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp.94 From United Shoe, the idea of
intentional-tort/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2018).
91. The best example of this is a car accident. In example one, Donna is
driving down the road and pulls up to an intersection. At the intersection, she
believes she has the green light; Donna actually has the red light. She drives into
the intersection and collides with Vanessa. Vanessa is injured by the impact. This
is an example of a negligent tort. In example two, Donna is driving down the road
and pulls up to an intersection. At the intersection, she sees Vanessa, whom she
despises because last week Vanessa stole her wallet. Donna decides she is going
to stop Vanessa to get her wallet back, so she drives into Vanessa’s car. Vanessa
is injured by the impact. This is an example of an intentional tort. Donna’s
intention to hit Vanessa’s car is relevant; her lack of intent to injure Vanessa is
irrelevant.
92. Negligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
93. Id.
94. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358–59 (D.
Mass. 1950). United Shoe involved an anti-trust action, where counsel opposed
the introduction of hundreds of exhibits on the basis that the corporations and
their officers consulted counsel to commit a crime or tort. See id. The court
decided this assertion was unfounded, but included torts in their crime-fraud
analysis. This analysis created a rule: “(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is
or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made
(a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with
this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact
of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of
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applying the crime-fraud exception to torts popped up in
courts around the nation.95
After Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence,96
more courts applied the crime-fraud exception to tortious
conduct.97 In United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., the
District Court for the District of Columbia decided that the
exception has been applied to crimes; crimes and fraud; and
crimes, fraud, and torts.98 However, it did not matter which
definition was used in the case, as the violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act encompassed all three, a crime,
fraud, and tort.99 In Diamond v. Stratton, the Southern
District of New York applied the crime-fraud exception to
intentional infliction of emotional distress.100 The court
supported their decision by quoting Professor Wigmore:
To deny the protection of the privilege to communications in aid of
fraud while granting it to communications in aid of another
intentional tort would draw a too “crude boundary”, as
characterized by Wigmore, who also questions “how the law can
protect a deliberate plan to defy the law and oust another person of

strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or
(ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the
purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed
and (b) not waived by the client.” Id.
95. See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1172
(D. S.C. 1974) (“The attorney-client privilege was not meant to protect such
communications intended to foster criminal, fraudulent, or tortious conduct.”),
aff’d 540 F.2d 1215, 1217 (4th Cir. 1976); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings
in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 4-71 Civ. 435, 1971 WL 601 at *4 (D. Minn. Oct.
1, 1971) (“There is no attorney-client privilege if the services of the lawyer were
sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the
client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime, tort, or fraud.”).
96. FED. R. EVID., Historical Note, supra note 22.
97. See 24 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 5501 n.207 (last updated Apr. 2019)
(listing various attorney-client cases involving intentional torts).
98. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 624 (D.D.C. 1979)
(“The law of attorney-client privilege has long recognized an exception. . . . [t]he
prohibited purpose that triggers the unveiling has been described as a ‘crime,’
‘crime or fraud,’ and ‘crime, fraud, or tort.’”).
99. Id.
100. Diamond v. Stratton, 95 F.R.D. 503, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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his rights, whatever the precise nature of those rights may be.” 101

Then, in 1983 in Irving Trust Co. v. Gomez, the Southern
District decided communications in furtherance of the
“tortious conduct” of a credit scam were not protected by the
attorney-client privilege.102
In 1985, the Supreme Court acknowledged a
respondent’s argument pertaining to the exception to the
attorney client privilege.103 However, the Court did not
discuss the “ordinary torts” language, and took up the issue
based on fraud instead.104 The same year, the D.C. Circuit
decided spoliation of evidence, a misconduct other than a
crime or fraud, could be applied to the crime-fraud
exception.105 The court stated, “Communications otherwise
protected by the attorney-client privilege are not protected if
the communications are made in furtherance of a crime,
fraud, or other misconduct.”106 In 1997, the D.C. District
followed the Circuit’s lead in Recycling Solutions, Inc. v.
District of Columbia, deciding that “other misconduct” in In
re Sealed Case applied to the furtherance of racial or ethnic
discrimination.107 However, they also noted that the rest of
the country had not completely caught up the D.C. Circuit

101. Id. (quoting 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2298, at 577 (McNaughton rev.
1961)).
102. Irving Trust Co. v. Gomez, 100 F.R.D. 273, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
103. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 354
(1985) (“They point out that the privilege does not shield the disclosure of
communications relating to the planning or commission of ongoing fraud, crimes,
and ordinary torts.”). Commodity involved a debtor’s trustee attempting to waive
a corporation’s attorney-client privilege in a bankruptcy matter. Id. at 345.
104. Id. at 354 (deciding that the respondents did not make the threshold
showing of fraud to apply the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client
privilege).
105. See In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399–400 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
106. Id. at 399 (emphasis added) (citing Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 14
(1933)); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir.
1984); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
107. Recycling Sols., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 175 F.R.D. 407, 409 (D.D.C.
1997).
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precedent.108
The expansion of the crime-fraud exception continued
into the millennium. In Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG,
a spoliation case, the Eastern District of Virginia stated,
“The term ‘crime/fraud exception,’ however, is a ‘bit of a
misnomer,’ . . . as many courts have applied the exception to
situations falling well outside of the definitions of crime or
fraud.”109 Then, in Safety Today, Inc. v. Roy the Southern
District of Ohio determined that the crime-fraud exception
would apply to tortious interference with a contract.110 The
court concluded:
Ohio courts have, and will continue to, analyze wrongful conduct
not strictly falling into the category of either crimes or frauds on a
case-by-case basis to determine if the conduct involves similar
elements of malicious or injurious intent and deliberate falsehood.
If it does, there is no reason why the law should prevent disclosure
of the role an attorney may have played in assisting his or her client
to commit that type of act, which itself has no social value.111

In addition to support from the cases above, intentional
torts as part of the crime-fraud exception would positively
impact legal social policy, as intentional torts serve no
purpose to society, like crime.112 By including intentional
torts in the crime-fraud-tort exception, clients will be unable
to use attorneys to perpetuate socially unacceptable
activities, such as sexual harassment and defamation, as
their attorney could disclose discussions about such
activities.
While “sexual harassment” can include crimes, some
parts of sexual harassment consist of tortious conduct, like
intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation.
108. Id.
109. Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 222 F.R.D. 280, 288 (E.D. Va. 2004)
(quoting Blanchard v. EdgeMark Fin. Corp., 192 F.R.D. 233, 241 (N.D. Ill. 2000)).
110. Safety Today, Inc. v. Roy, No. 2:12-cv-510, 2013 WL 5597065, *6 (S.D.
Ohio 2013).
111. Id. at *5.
112. Diamond v. Stratton, 95 F.R.D. 503, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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For suits regarding sexual harassment, the crime-fraud-tort
exception can step in to determine if certain organizations
covered up alleged misconduct. An example of this is the
USA Gymnastics case involving Larry Nassar.113 Aly
Raisman, a former decorated Olympian, brought suit against
USA Gymnastics for its alleged involvement in covering up
Nassar’s actions.114 Additionally, McKayla Maroney, another
former decorated Olympian, claimed that she was paid off by
USA Gymnastics to keep quiet on Nassar’s actions, meaning
that USA Gymnastics knew about Nassar’s actions prior to
his criminal case.115 If Nassar consulted a USA gymnastics
113. Jen Kirby, The sex abuse scandal surrounding USA Gymnastics team
doctor Larry Nassar, explained, VOX (May 16, 2018, 4:45 PM), https://www.vox
.com/identities/2018/1/19/16897722/sexual-abuse-usa-gymnastics-larry-nassarexplained; see generally Larry Nassar sex abuse scandal, BBC NEWS (Apr. 26,
2019 at 2:50 PM), https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/clwx28lpp90t/larry-nassarsex-abuse-scandal.
114. Christine Brennan, Ally Raisman’s lawsuit against U.S. Olympics
Committee, USA Gymnastics to serve as silver lining, USA TODAY (Mar. 2, 2018,
5:51 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/columnist/brennan/2018/03/02/
aly-raismans-lawsuit-against-u-s-olympic-committee-usa-gymnastics-servesilver-lining/390825002/; Darren Reynolds, Aly Raisman files lawsuit against
USOC, USA Gymnastics over handling of Larry Nassar, ABC NEWS (Mar. 2,
2018, 11:15 AM) https://abcnews.go.com/US/aly-raisman-files-lawsuit-usoc-usagymnastics-handling/story?id=53453469; See also Eddie Pells, 51 Women are
Suing the U.S. Olympic Committee for Failing to Prevent Abuse By Larry Nassar,
PBS (Mar. 15, 2019, 5:12 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/51-womensue-u-s-olympic-committee-for-failing-to-stop-nassar-abuse. Importantly,
Michigan needed to extend the statute of limitations for these suits against
Nassar. Jay Tokasz, What you need to know about New York’s Child Victims Act,
BUFFALO NEWS (Feb. 8, 2019), https://buffalonews.com/2019/02/08/ new-yorkstate-child-victims-act-frequently-asked-questions/. Other states have similarly
extended the statute of limitations for sexual assault and harassment cases. Id.
Most recently, New York passed the Child Victims Act, with the focus on priest
sexual abuse. Elizabeth Joseph, ‘This is society’s way of saying we are sorry,’ New
York Governor tells survivors of sex abuse before signing Child Victims Act into
law, CNN (Feb. 14, 2019, 4:59 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/14/us/newyork-child-victims-act-signed/index.html. The analysis for Nassar could easily
apply to the Catholic Church’s alleged cover-ups. See Pennsylvania grand jury
finds some police and district attorneys helped Catholic church cover up priest
abuse,
THE
MORNING
CALL
(Sept.
1,
2018),
https://www.mcall.com/news/pennsylvania/mc-nws-grand-jury-law-enforcementpriests-20180823-story.html,
115. Richard Winton et al., McKayla Maroney accuses USOC and USA
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lawyer about how to get around the law and continue his
sexual crimes and torts, the conversations would be
discoverable in the civil case if a crime-fraud-tort exception
were implemented.116 This would make it easier to prove
Nassar’s guilt and could show that USA Gymnastics is liable
for helping Nassar perpetuate his inappropriate sexual
behavior.117
In the age of social media, defamation is a common
occurrence.118 A crime-fraud-tort exception could have an
impact on these suits, especially against major corporations,
like news outlets, or political actors, as they have attorneys
on call to consult before acting. If the defamer consulted an
attorney, the conversations could be discoverable, making it
easier to prove defamation.
The prior case law since the 1950s and the lack of social
value of intentional torts, similar to crimes, demonstrates

Gymnastics of covering up sexual abuse with secret settlement, L.A. TIMES
(Dec. 21, 2017, 12:05 PM) http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-maroneygynnastics-settlement-20171220-story.html; see also Tracy Connor & Sarah
Fitzpatrick, Gymnastics scandal: 8 times Larry Nassar could have been stopped,
NBC News (Jan. 28, 2018, 8:34 PM) (explaining how Nassar could have been
stopped sooner within USA Gymnastics and Michigan State University)
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/gymnastics-scandal-8-times-larrynassar-could-have-been-stopped-n841091.
116. Important to remember however, is the Upjohn requirement for
businesses. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981). Nassar’s
conversations may not be protected anyway if he was not told to consult the
lawyer by his superior or the conversation was not to figure out the legal
implications and response by USA Gymnastics. See id. at 394.
117. This can also apply to other situations in the Me Too Movement. See
generally Christen A. Johnson & KT Hawbaker, #MeToo: A timeline of events,
CHI. TRIBUNE (May 19, 2019, 2:10 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/
lifestyles/ct-me-too-timeline-20171208-htmlstory.html.
118. See, e.g., Luke Barr, Trump wants to get to the ‘bottom of’ alleged anticonservative bias on social media, ABC NEWS (Mar. 20, 2019 6:00 AM),
https://6abc.com/trump-wants-to-get-to-the-bottom-of-alleged-anti-conservativebias-on-social-media/5207595/; Michelle Kaminsky, As Infowars’ Alex Jones
Fights Defamation Lawsuits, Let’s Talk Media Literacy Programs, FORBES (Aug.
1, 2018, 5:40 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michellefabio/2018/08/01/asinfowars-alex-jones-fights-defamation-lawsuits-lets-talk-media-literacyprograms/#55f0577b13ad.
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strong support to include intentional torts in the crime-fraud
exception.
B. Resistance of and Arguments Against the Crime-FraudTort Exception
While multiple courts have applied the crime-fraud
exception to intentional torts, some courts have resisted the
trend.119 Generally, this resistance has developed in two
forms. Either the court claims it does not have the power to
extend the crime-fraud exception out to intentional torts,120
or the court claims that the evidence does not fulfill the
required showing under the traditional prima-facie
standard.121
Coleman v. American Broadcasting Cos. and Martin v.
American Bankers Life Assur. Co. of Florida demonstrate the
first form of resistance, the courts’ lack of power.122 In
Coleman, the court refused to apply the crime-fraud
exception to a sexual harassment and retaliation
concealment allegation.123 The court acknowledged that
courts have expanded the crime-fraud exception, but in
business related, intentional tort areas.124 However, the
court reasoned that no court had gone so far as to extend the
crime-fraud exception to sexual harassment and retaliation,
and thus it could not do so itself.125 Similarly, in Martin, the
District Court of the Virgin Islands decided that the crimefraud exception did not apply to the furtherance of a bad faith
insurance claim because the plaintiff did not provide

119. E.g., Martin v. Am. Bankers Life Assur. Co., 184 F.R.D. 263, 265 (D.V.I.
1998); Coleman v. Am. Broad. Cos., 106 F.R.D. 201, 209 (D.D.C. 1985).
120. E.g., Coleman, 106 F.R.D. at 209.
121. E.g., Constand v. Cosby, 232 F.R.D. 494, 500 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
122. Martin, 184 F.R.D. at 265; Coleman, 106 F.R.D. at 209.
123. See Coleman, 106 F.R.D. at 209.
124. Id. at 208.
125. See id. at 208–09.

1236

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

precedent that bad faith is a tort.126 The problem was not in
applying the crime-fraud exception to a tort, but the court’s
ability to do so within the constraints of common law.127
Constad v. Cosby demonstrates the second form of
resistance: failure to fulfill the prima-facie standard.128 In
Constad, the court decided that there was not a strong
enough showing that the defendant used their attorney to
continue the alleged defamation.129 In Constad, the court’s
reasoning was summed up in a sentence, without any
guidance on how it decided the alleging party did not fulfill
the crime-fraud prima-facie showing.130 However, it is
important to keep in mind that in many crime-fraud
exception cases, the alleging party generally does not
successfully make the prima-facie showing.131
In addition to the above cases, critics may claim that
including intentional torts in the crime-fraud exception will
chill clients’ willingness to communicate with their attorney
about intentional torts they have committed or to seek advice
to avoid committing.132 While this may chill client
communication, it will not do so any more than what is
already chilled by the current crime-fraud exception.

126. Martin, 184 F.R.D. at 265.
127. Id.; see also Ferrara & DiMercurio, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 173
F.R.D. 7, 13–14 (D. Mass. 1997) (similarly holding that there was no precedent
to apply the crime-fraud exception to a tort).
128. Constand v. Cosby, 232 F.R.D. 494, 500 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
129. Id. This decision can be categorized in two ways—as an out from applying
the crime-fraud exception to an intentional tort or as a true failure to meet the
required prima-facie showing.
130. See id.
131. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 773 F.2d 204, 207
(8th Cir. 1984) (holding that the proof of the crime-fraud exception was “too
speculative”).
132. For a parallel argument supporting adoption of psychotherapist-patient
privilege, see Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1996) (“If the privilege were
rejected, confidential conversations between psychotherapists and their patients
would surely be chilled, particularly when it is obvious that the circumstances
that give rise to the need for treatment will probably result in litigation.”).
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Additionally, there is no need to protect communications that
further intentional torts. If the client is seeking advice to
avoid committing an intentional tort, like under the current
crime-fraud exception,133 they do not waive the attorneyclient privilege. The crime-fraud exception seeks to prevent
socially unacceptable conduct, not to punish those that are
attempting to comply with the law.
Critics may also claim that including intentional torts in
the crime-fraud-intentional tort exception would render the
Model Professional Rules and state professional rules
ineffective, as they work hand in hand with the attorneyclient privilege. However, the attorney-client privilege and
confidentiality vary greatly.134 Confidentiality and privileges
have their own sources, scope, method of enforcement, and
exceptions.135 A change in an exception to privilege would not
inherently affect confidentiality. Additionally, the statutory
change would be easy—simply adding “intentional tort” to
each state’s statute.
V. HOW TO INCLUDE INTENTIONAL TORTS IN THE CRIMEFRAUD EXCEPTION
If torts are added to the crime-fraud exception, it should
only encompass intentional torts, rather than negligent and
intentional torts, as negligent torts do not involve the
culpability that intentional torts require.136 If negligent torts
are included, the exception would encompass acts where the
actor failed to use proper care.137 Therefore, only intentional
torts should be included in the crime-fraud-tort exception.
133. Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States, supra note 13, at § 8:2
(explaining that the client’s intent must be for an illegal or fraudulent purpose).
134. LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE
202 (4th ed. 2016).
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135. Id.
136. See Intentional Torts, supra note 90.
137. Id. If the actor simply acted carelessly, they did not intend to commit the
act. If they did not intend it, they could not have sought out advice to commit an
improper act.
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This would balance the social policy of confidential attorneyclient communications on one hand, and the other social
policy of preventing societal wrongs on the other, without
unfairly including careless acts.
There are three practical options to add intentional torts
to the crime-fraud exception: (1) add the crime-fraud-tort
exception to the Federal Rules of Evidence, (2) let common
law continue to develop it, or (3) have the Supreme Court
rule on it. While each route can be used, the Supreme Court
is the most effective route.
A. Federal Rules of Evidence
Option one, adding the exception to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, is the most unlikely and unhelpful option for many
reasons. First, neither the attorney-client privilege, nor the
crime-fraud exception are outlined in the Federal Rules of
Evidence.138 While Rules 501 and 502 explain aspects of the
attorney-client privilege, they do not lay out the attorneyclient privilege themselves.139 This would mean that
Congress would need to add the attorney-client privilege and
crime-fraud-tort exception. It seems that if Congress took
this path, it would need to add all the privileges
acknowledged in federal court.
Second, it is difficult to believe that Congress would be
willing to amend the Federal Rules of Evidence so greatly
because it already decided to avoid incorporating privileges
when it first adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence.140 Third,
the Federal Rules already state what to do when confronted
with an attorney-client privilege problem: refer to common
law.141 Fourth, Congress does not greatly amend the Federal

138. See FED. R. EVID.
139. See FED. R. EVID. 501, 502; see also Bartholomew, supra note 26, at 1020–
21.
140. Bartholomew, supra note 26, at 1020–21.
141. Id.
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Rules of Evidence.142
However, if Congress decides to amend the Federal
Rules of Evidence to add a crime-fraud-tort exception, it
should be as follows:
503: Attorney-Client Privilege: Crime-Fraud-Tort Exception
(a) The attorney-client privilege includes any situation
where:
(1) legal advice is sought,
(2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity,
(3) the communication relating to that purpose,
(4) made in confidence,
(5) by the client,
(6) are at his insistence permanently protected,
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser,
(8) except the protection be waived.143
(b) The attorney-client privilege applies to all attorneyclient communication, except:
(1) Crime. Where the client seeks information from the
professional legal adviser to commit or continue a
crime. Crimes within state and federal statutes shall

142. For example, the 2018 amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence
included only three changes: revising the text of the ancient documents
exceptions to hearsay in Rule 803 and adding two e-discovery self-authenticating
requirements to Rule 902. Federal Rules of Evidence Amendments for 2018,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.rulesofevidence.org/
federal-rules-of-evidence-amendments-for-2018/. While adding e-discovery is a
substantial change, incorporating the entire the attorney-client privilege would
be a larger and more difficult feat. To amend a federal rule of evidence, a
congresswoman or congressman would need to bring the matter in front of
Congress. RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20617, HOW BILLS AMEND
STATUTES (2003), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20617.pdf. Unfortunately, as the
crime-fraud exception varies based on jurisdiction, a congressman or
congresswoman will not likely be flagged as to the inconsistency as it is not an
intra-jurisdictional issue.
143. NICHOLAS, supra note 5, at 291 (citing 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292, at
554 (McNaughton rev. 1961)) (listing the above elements).
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apply to this exception.
(2) Fraud. Where the client seeks information from the
professional legal adviser to commit or continue a
fraud. Frauds within state and federal statutes shall
apply to this exception.
(3) Tort. Where the client seeks information from the
professional legal adviser to commit an intentional
tort. An intentional tort is a harm to another,
intentionally, rather than negligently, recklessly, or
knowingly.
(c) If an exception to the privilege applies, the attorney
can be compelled to testify regarding the communication
between herself and her client.
B. Common Law
Option two, letting common law continue to develop the
crime-fraud exception, is practical, but unhelpful. The
problem with the current crime-fraud exception is
inconsistency.144 The federal government looks to state law
to determine the attorney-client privilege, and in this case,
the crime-fraud exception. However, states are inconsistent
on the crime-fraud exception.145 States do not have the same
crime-fraud exception statute requirements, some states do
not have a crime-fraud exception statute at all, and other
states leave the crime-fraud exception solely to common
law.146 While there is a trend in applying the crime-fraud
exception to intentional torts,147 some courts have refused to

144. Compare In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399–400 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(holding that the crime-fraud exception applies to “other misconduct”) with
Coleman v. Am. Broad. Cos., 106 F.R.D. 201, 209 (D.D.C. 1985) (holding that the
crime-fraud exception had not previously been applied to defamation, and
therefore they could not apply the exception in this case).
145. Compare ALA. R. EVID. 502(b) with OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2317.02(A)
(West 2017).
146. See infra app. Fig. One.
147. See supra, Part V.
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do so.148 This system creates inconsistent rulings, all based
on the physical location of the federal court. If an across the
board crime-fraud-tort exception is created, without waiting
on common law to develop it, crime-fraud exception
application would be more consistent.149
C. Supreme Court
Option three, a Supreme Court ruling on the crimefraud-tort exception, is the most realistic and useful option
to create a consistent system. There are many reasons to
choose this option. First, Congress would not have to battle
over the terms of an amendment; the Supreme Court can
issue a decision by a majority of nine, rather than two houses
of Congress. Second, a case does not have to be developed like
an amendment; case are organically created. Third, out of
seven thousand cases appealed to the Supreme Court each
year,150 there is bound to be a crime-fraud exception case
within the next few years.151 Fourth, and most importantly,

148. See supra, Section V.A.
149. While many areas of law are inconsistent between jurisdictions, the
crime-fraud exception should particularly be consistent because of its impact on
attorneys themselves, not just clients. For example, states differ on marijuana
legality. Marijuana Overview, NCSL, http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-andcriminal-justice/marijuana-overview.aspx (last visited July 6, 2019). This solely
impacts the client’s liability. However, differing crime-fraud exceptions impact
what an attorney can consider privileged, not just the client’s liability.
150. About the Supreme Court, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts
.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educationaloutreach/activity-resources/about (last visited Mar. 21, 2018).
151. While the Supreme Court has not addressed the attorney-client privilege
since 2011, United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162 (2011), it has
regularly decided evidentiary issues. E.g., Turner v. United States, 137 S. Ct.
1885 (2017); Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521 (2014); Williams v. Illinois, 567
U.S. 50 (2012). Additionally, the crime-fraud exception has recently become a hot
topic among lawyers due to the Trump-Cohen relationship controversy. Paul
Rosenzweig, Michael Cohen, Attorney-Client Privilege and the Crime-Fraud
Exception, LAWFARE (Apr. 10, 2018, 12:36 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
michael-cohen-attorney-client-privilege-and-crime-fraud-exception; Ugonna Eze,
The Cohen case and attorney-client privilege, CONSTITUTION CTR. (Apr. 13, 2018),
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/the-cohen-case-and-attorney-client-privilege.
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the Supreme Court already successfully created a uniform
system around part of the crime-fraud exception in Zolin.152
In camera review is consistent in both state and federal
courts because the Supreme Court created guidelines. The
Court can do the same for the crime-fraud-tort exception
generally.
If the Supreme Court were to create guidelines for the
crime-fraud-tort exception, they should be as follows:
The crime-fraud exception, as generally adopted by common law,
currently applies to clients attempting to receive advice from a
lawyer to assist in continuing, covering up, or committing a crime
or fraud. Some courts have extended the application to intentional
torts. To create consistency in common law application, courts
should apply the crime-fraud exception to situations involving a
client attempting to receive advice from a lawyer to assist in
continuing, covering up, or committing an intentional tort.

For the purposes of judicial application of the crimefraud-tort exception, intentional torts should be construed
narrowly, as to exclude wanton, willful, and reckless
behavior.153 This behavior includes when “a person acts or
fails to act, with a conscious realization that injury is a
probable . . . result of such conduct.”154 Additionally,
“intentional tortious conduct is when an ordinary,
reasonable, prudent person would believe an injury was
substantially certain to result from his conduct.”155
Intentional conduct requires more than the knowledge and
appreciation of risk.156 This is not just a “foreseeable risk
which an ordinary, reasonable, prudent person would avoid,”
as that would be ordinary negligence.157 Current state and

152. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
153. Melanie L. Carpenter, Petersen v. Sioux Valley Hospital: Reckless
Infliction of Emotional Distress, 39 S.D. L. REV. 359, 372 (1993).
154. Id. at 373 (quoting VerBouwens v. Hamm Wood Prods., 334 N.W.2d 874,
876 (S.D. 1983)).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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federal statutes and rules must be made consistent with this
guideline.
While application of this guideline may not be perfect, as
no guideline application ever is, it should provide guidance
in an area where none has been established by a court higher
than the district level. A broad standard diminishes the
ability for circuit splits and will help uphold stare decisis.
As noted at the end of the guideline, state and federal
congresses may need to update laws to include torts in the
crime-fraud-tort exception. This change should not be too
difficult, as the amendment would only require adding
“intentional tort” to the list of applicable exceptions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the current political climate and news, and the
trend toward accepting intentional torts as part of the crimefraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, intentional
torts should officially be included in the crime-fraud
exception. The attorney-client privilege is a pillar of
American democracy that should not be tainted by a
relationship based on intentional torts—a negative aspect of
society. A crime-fraud-tort exception would increase
discovery of materials to help fight injustices that should not
be hidden behind the shield of the attorney-client privilege.
The sooner the exception is broadened, most easily by the
Supreme Court, the sooner we increase access to these
injustice-fighting materials.
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VII. APPENDIX

Figure One158
State
Alabama

Attorney-Client
Privilege
(Statute or Court Rule)
Client privilege holder:
prevents disclosure of
confidential
communications for
professional legal
services between: (1)
the client/client’s
representative and the
attorney/attorney’s
representative, (2) the
attorney and the
attorney’s
representative, (3) the
client/client’s
representative, the
attorney/attorney’s
representative, and an
attorney/attorney’s
representative
representing another
party of common
interest, (4)
representatives of the
client, and (5)
attorneys representing
the same client159

Crime-Fraud
Exception
Information sought
to commit or plan to
commit a crime or
fraud160

158. Imwinkelried, supra note 17, at app. D (providing the list of state
attorney-client privilege statutes and court rules).
159. ALA. R. EVID. 502(b).
160. ALA. R. EVID. 502(d)(1).
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Alaska

See Alabama161

Arizona

In a civil case, an
attorney cannot be
examined regarding
communication by his
or her client or the
attorney’s advice in
the course of the
attorney’s
employment. An
attorney’s secretary,
paralegal, legal
assistant,
stenographer, or clerk
who acquired
knowledge through
professional capacity
must obtain
employer’s consent to
be examined.163
See Alabama164
The client has the
privilege to refuse to

Arkansas
California

161. ALASKA R. EVID. 503(b).
162. ALASKA R. EVID. 503(d)(1).
163. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2234 (1994).
164. ARK. R. EVID. 502(b).
165. ARK. R. EVID. 502(d)(1).
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Information sought,
obtained, or used by
the client to enable
anyone to commit or
plan a crime or
fraud waives the
attorney-client
privilege. This
applies when the
client knew or
should have known
the action was a
crime or fraud.162
N/A

See Alaska165
Lawyer’s services
sought or obtained

1246

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
disclose and prevent
the lawyer from
disclosing a
confidential
communication
between the
lawyer/client.166

Colorado

Connecticut

An attorney cannot be
examined regarding
communication by his
or her client or the
attorney’s advice in
the course of the
attorney’s
employment. An
attorney’s secretary,
paralegal, legal
assistant,
stenographer, or clerk
who acquired
knowledge through
professional capacity
must obtain
employer’s consent to
be examined.168
Communications are
privileged when made
in confidence between
a client and an
attorney for the
purpose of seeking or

[Vol. 67

to aid anyone to
plan or commit a
crime or fraud; the
exception does not
apply to
confidential
communications on
medical cannabis or
adult-use cannabis
if the lawyer
advises the client on
conflicting federal
law.167
N/A

N/A

166. CAL. EVID. CODE § 954 (West 1965).
167. CAL. EVID. CODE § 956 (West 2018).
168. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107(1)(b) (West 2017).

2019]
Delaware
Dist. Of
Columbia

Florida

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
giving legal advice.169
See Alabama170
There is no clear
attorney-client
privilege, however
there is a statute
regarding attorneyclient privilege for the
government. It
provides, in part:
“Nothing in [this law]
shall limit, waive, or
abrogate the scope or
nature of the attorneyclient privilege, . . .
with respect to
communications
between attorneys
employed by the Office
of the Attorney
General and
subordinate agency
personnel, or legal
advice given by Office
of the Attorney
General attorneys to
subordinate agency
personnel before the
date of the
appointment of these
attorneys to positions
in the subordinate
agencies.”172
A client may prevent
anyone from disclosing
confidential

169. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-2 (West 2017).
170. DEL. R. EVID. 502(b).
171. DEL. R. EVID. 502(d)(1).
172. D.C. CODE § 1-608.66 (2013).
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See Alaska171
N/A

Information sought,
obtained, or used by
the client to enable
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information made in
the course of legal
services.173

Georgia

Guam
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois

Indiana

Public policy requires
that communications
between attorney and
client are excluded
from evidence.175
The attorney-client
privilege exists.176
See Alabama177
See Alabama179
Except as provided by
the U.S. Constitution,
Illinois Constitution,
or the Supreme Court
rules, privileges are
governed by common
law, interpreted by
Illinois courts.181
Attorneys are not
required to testify
about confidential
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anyone to commit or
plan a crime or
fraud waives the
attorney-client
privilege. This
applies when the
client knew the
action was a crime
or fraud.174
N/A

N/A
See Alaska178
See Alaska180
N/A

N/A

173. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.502(2) (West 2000).
174. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.502(4)(a) (West 2000).
175. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-5-501 (West 2014).
176. GUAM R. EVID. 502.
177. HAW. R. EVID. 503(b).
178. HAW. R. EVID. 503(d)(1).
179. IDAHO R. EVID. 502(b) (repealed 2018).
180. IDAHO R. EVID. 502(d)(1).
181. ILL. R. EVID. 501 (providing a general rule where Rule 502 reflects Fed. R.
Evid. 502).
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Iowa

Kansas

Kentucky
Louisiana

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
communications made
to them in their
professional
capacity.182
A practicing attorney,
who obtained
confidential
communication by
reason of his or her
employment, cannot
testify.183
A client has the
privilege to prevent
confidential
attorney/client
communications from
being disclosed by
himself, his attorney,
or any other witness
who has knowledge of
the communication.184
This knowledge comes
from the attorneyclient communication
itself, in a manner not
reasonably anticipated
by the client, or from a
breach of the attorneyclient privilege.185
See Alabama187
A client has the
privilege to refuse

182. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-3-1(1) (West 1998).
183. IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West 2015).
184. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-426(a) (West 2011).
185. Id.
186. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-426(b)(1) (West 2011).
187. KY. R. EVID. 503(b).
188. KY. R. EVID. 503(d)(1).
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N/A

The communication
is not privileged if
the judge finds
sufficient evidence,
in addition to the
communication
itself, that legal
services was
“sought or obtained
in order to enable or
aid the commission
or planning of a
crime or tort.”186

See Alaska188
There is no
privilege if the
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Maine
Maryland
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disclosing or allowing
another to disclose
confidential
communication for
legal services when
the communication is:
(1) between the
client/client’s
representative and the
lawyer/lawyer’s
representative, (2)
between the lawyer
and lawyer’s
representative, (3) by
the client/lawyer/
representative to a
lawyer/lawyer’s
representative who
represents another
common interest
party, (4) between
client representatives
or between the client
and representative, (5)
among lawyers and
representatives
working for the same
client, or (6) between
lawyers’
representatives.189
See Alabama191
“A person may not be
compelled to testify in
violation of the
attorney-client

communication was
made in furtherance
of a crime or
fraud.190

See Alaska192
N/A

189. LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 506(B) (1993).
190. LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 506(C)(1)(b) (1993).
191. ME. R. EVID. 502(b).
192. ME. R. EVID. 502(d)(1).
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privilege.”193

Massachusetts

Michigan

Minnesota

Mississippi

Missouri

Montana

See Alabama194
“Privilege is governed
by the common law,
except as modified by
statute or court
rule.”196
Unless the client
consents, an attorney
and the attorney’s
employee cannot be
examined on any
communication from
the client to the
attorney or any
professional advice
given in response to
the communication.197
See Alabama198
Attorneys, regarding
their client’s
communication to
them or their advice in
response, are
incompetent to testify.
However, the attorney
may testify if the
client consents.200
An attorney cannot be

See Alaska195
N/A

N/A

See Alaska199
N/A

N/A

193. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-108 (West 1973).
194. MASS. R. EVID. 502(b).
195. MASS. R. EVID. 502(d)(1).
196. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. R. EVID. 501 (West 1978).
197. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(b) (West 2013).
198. MISS. R. EVID. 502(b).
199. MISS. R. EVID. 502(d)(1).
200. MO. ANN. STAT. § 491.060(3) (West 1977).
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1252

Nebraska

Nevada
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examined regarding
communication by his
or her client or the
attorney’s advice in
the course of the
attorney’s
employment. A client
cannot be examined,
unless he or she
volunteers.201
See Alabama202
The client has the
privilege to prevent
himself or another
person from disclosing
confidential
communications: (1)
between the
client/client’s
representative and the
lawyer/lawyer’s
representative, (2)
between the client’s
lawyer/lawyer’s
representatives, (3)
made for legal services
to the client, by the
client or the lawyer to
another lawyer
representing another
individual in a
common matter.204
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See Alaska203
“There is no
privilege if the
services of the
lawyer were sought
or obtained to
enable or aid
anyone to commit or
plan to commit
what the client
knew or reasonably
should have known
to be a crime or
fraud.”205

201. MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-803 (West 2009).
202. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-503(2) (West 1975).
203. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-503(4)(a) (West 1975).
204. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.095 (West 1971).
205. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.115(1) (West 1971).
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New
Hampshire

See Alabama206

See Alaska207

New
Jersey

Attorney-client
communications, made
in professional
confidence, are
privileged. The client
has the privilege to
refuse to disclose it or
let the
attorney/witness
disclose it. The witness
must have obtained
knowledge in the
communication
between
attorney/client, in a
manner not
reasonably
anticipated, from a
breach of the
lawyer/client
relationship, or from a
privileged
communication
between the client and
witness.208

The privilege does
not apply to “[a]
communication in
the course of legal
service sought or
obtained in aid of
the commission of a
crime or
fraud. . . .”209

New
Mexico
New
York

See Alabama210

See Alaska211

An attorney, employee, N/A
or anyone who obtains
knowledge about the

206. N.H. R. EVID. 502(b).
207. N.H. R. EVID. 502(d)(1).
208. N.J. R. EVID. 504(1).
209. N.J. R. EVID. 504(2).
210. N.M. R. EVID. 11-503(b).
211. N.M. R. EVID. 11-503(d)(1).

1254

North
Carolina

North
Dakota
Ohio

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
confidential
communication
between the
attorney/employee and
the client cannot
disclose the
communication in an
action, trial, or
hearing. However,
they may testify if the
client waives the
privilege.212
Privileges will be
determined in
accordance with the
law of this State,
unless otherwise
required by the U.S.
Constitution.213
See Alabama214
An attorney cannot
testify about attorneyclient communications
and the attorney’s
advice to the client.
However, the attorney
may be compelled to
testify if the client
voluntarily reveals the
substance of the
communication.216

[Vol. 67

N/A

See Alaska215
The communication
may be subject to in
camera inspection if
the party seeking
disclosure makes a
prima-facie showing
of “[b]ad faith,
fraud, or criminal
misconduct by the
client.” This is to
show the
communication by
the client to the
attorney or by the

212. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4503(a) (Consol. 2016).
213. N.C. R. EVID. 501.
214. N.D. R. EVID. 502(b).
215. N.D. R. EVID. 502(d)(1).
216. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2317.02(A) (West 2017).
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Oklahoma

Oregon

Pennsylvania

Puerto
Rico

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

See Alabama218
See Alabama220
An attorney is not
permitted to testify
regarding confidential
communications made
to him by his client.
The client cannot be
compelled to testify,
unless the privilege is
waived.222
The client can prevent
another from
disclosing a
confidential
communication
between her and her
attorney. The privilege
may be claimed by the
client, client’s
authorized privilege
claimer, and the
attorney, if claimed in
the interest of the
client.223

attorney to the
client to aid or
further
ongoing/future bad
faith by the
client.217
See Alaska219
See Alaska221
N/A

“There is no
privilege under this
rule if . . . [t]he
services of the
attorney were
sought or obtained
to enable or aid
anyone to commit or
plan to commit a
crime, tortious act,
or fraud.”224

217. Id.
218. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2502(B) (West 2013).
219. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2502(D)(1) (West 2013).
220. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.225(2) (West 2010).
221. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.225(4)(a) (West 2010).
222. 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5916, 5928 (West 1978).
223. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32, § 25(B).
224. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32, § 25(C)(1).
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1256
Rhode
Island
South
Carolina

South
Dakota
Tennessee

Texas
Utah

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The privileges in
common law are
retained.225
Privileges are
governed by the
common law, as
interpreted by the
court in light of reason
and experience, unless
otherwise required by
the South Carolina
Constitution, U.S.
Constitution, or South
Carolina statute.226
See Alabama227
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N/A
N/A

See Alaska228

An attorney cannot, in N/A
giving testimony
against a client or
individual who
consulted the attorney,
disclose any suitpending
communication to the
attorney to the
individual’s injury.229
See Alabama230
See Alaska231
A client has the
See Alaska233
privilege to refuse to
disclose or prevent
another person from

225. R.I. R. EVID. 501.
226. S.C. R. EVID. 501.
227. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-502(b) (1979).
228. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-502(d)(1) (1979).
229. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3-105 (West 2009).
230. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b).
231. TEX. R. EVID. 503(d)(1).
233. UTAH R. EVID. 504(d)(1).
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Vermont
Virginia

Virgin
Islands
Washington

West
Virginia

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
disclosing confidential
communications. If the
communications were
for professional legal
services and the
communications were
between and among:
the client/client’s
representatives,
lawyers/lawyer’s
representatives, or
lawyers representing
another in a common
matter, then the
privilege applies.232
See Alabama234
The attorney-client
privilege is governed
by common law,
interpreted by
Virginia courts in light
of reason and
experience, unless
otherwise provided in
statute.236
The common law
governs privileges.237
See Missouri238
Unless otherwise
provided in the U.S.
Constitution, West
Virginia Constitution,

See Alaska235
N/A

N/A
N/A
N/A

232. UTAH R. EVID. 504(b).
234. VT. R. EVID. 502(b).
235. VT. R. EVID. 502(d)(1).
236. VA. R. EVID. 2:502.
237. V.I. R. EVID. 501 (mirroring FED. R. EVID. 501).
238. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (West 2018).

1257

1258

Wisconsin

Wyoming
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rules by the Supreme
Court of Appeals of
West Virginia, or West
Virginia statutes,
common law governs
privilege.239
See Alabama240
See Alaska241
An attorney cannot
N/A
testify about a
communication made
by a client or his
advice to the client. He
may testify if the
client gives consent.
He may be compelled
to testify if the client
voluntarily testified.242

239. W. VA. R. EVID. 501.
240. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.03(2) (West 2014).
241. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.03(4)(a) (West 2014).
242. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(i) (West 1977).

